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CHAPTER 10 
A Property Theory Perspective 
on Russian Enterprise Reform 
Michael A. Heller 
Why have Russian enterprises performed so poorly since privatization? This is 
a problem with many answers, each independently sufficient: the bleak mix in-
cludes vacillating macroeconomic policy, endemic corruption, a corrosive tax 
structure, poor human capital, and so forth. Even well-performing companies 
must hide good results because visible profits or dividends provoke confisca-
tory taxation and mafia visits. In such a difficult environment, the rule of law 
generally, and corporate governance in particular, may seem not to count. 
Macroeconomic implosions dwarf subtle distinctions in corporate dividend 
rules or minority voting rights. 
Nevertheless, the rule of law matters in explaining the puzzle of Russian 
enterprise reform. This chapter suggests that corporate governance problems in 
Russia have important, though previously unnoticed effects. Even if Russia 
were to correct legal policy errors elsewhere in its economy, Russian corpora-
tions would likely continue to fail in impressive ways. More precisely, the ini-
tial structure of corporate ownership may play an independent explanatory role 
in current corporate performance, or in the jargon of the day, performance is 
path-dependent in interesting ways. 1 This argument complements recent evi-
dence demonstrating the link between well-designed corporate governance 
rules and well-performing equity markets (La Porta et al. 1996; see also Shleifer 
and Vishny 1997). Though it may be impossible to quantify the effects of ini-
tial conditions on current economic performance in Russia, the rule of law nev-
ertheless matters in subtle ways. 
A conventional story of corporate governance might predict that the ini-
tial distribution of shares during privatization would not matter much in Rus-
sia or elsewhere. According to this story, the initial pattern of corporate share 
ownership may affect who ends up with each slice of the pie, but will not stop 
owners from rearranging poorly deployed real assets to create bigger pies. In 
Russia, then, the initial distribution of shares to competing groups of insiders-
managers, workers, and local governments-should not defeat the strong in-
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centives these new owners have, in their capacity as majority shareholders, to 
reach Coasian bargains that would enrich them all. Perhaps new owners cook 
the books and mercilessly freeze out minority shareholders, but this is only a 
transitional concern on the way to more streamlined ownership and more com-
petent management. So long as corporations begin to prepare standard accounts, 
develop open share registries, and hold regular shareholder meetings, any of a 
range of reasonable corporate governance regimes should do its job over time. 
Yet, in Russia, the continuing dissipation of firm assets and the absurdly 
low valuation of Russian stock relative to these assets belie the conventional 
story. This chapter suggests that insights from property theory might help ex-
plain why the corporate governance regime has not had the positive effects that 
reformers predicted. Fragmented ownership of poorly performing corporations 
may be a stark example of what I call anticommons property, a wasteful cor-
porate governance regime that results when initial share ownership is distrib-
uted to competing groups of insiders who then block each other from making 
value-maximizing moves with corporate assets (see Heller 1998). 
Anticommons property is most readily understood as the inverse of com-
mons property. In a commons, by definition, multiple owners may each use a 
given resource, and no one may exclude another (Michelman 1982). When too 
many owners have such rights of use, the resource is prone to overuse-a 
tragedy of the commons (Hardin 1968; Ostrom 1990). Familiar examples in-
clude depleted fisheries and overgrazed fields. In an anticommons, by my def-
inition, multiple owners may each exclude others from a scarce resource, and 
no one has an effective right to use (Heller 1998). When there are too many 
owners holding rights to exclude, the resource is prone to underuse-a tragedy 
of the anticommons. Corporate governance in Russia may be an unfortunate ex-
ample of a tragedy of the anticommons. Legal and economic scholars have 
mostly overlooked this tragedy, but it can appear whenever governments cre-
ate new property rights. Conventional models of the rule of law focus on the 
clarity of property rights; the anti commons approach suggests that the content 
of rights may be as important. For example, Rebecca Eisenberg and I (Heller 
and Eisenberg 1998) offer an example in biomedical research, where sharply 
defined, nonoverlapping rights in gene fragments may have inadvertently 
blocked development of gene-based drugs. 
The goals of this chapter are to introduce the idea of anti commons prop-
erty as a tool for corporate governance theory and, more specifically, to aid un-
derstanding of Russian enterprise transition. The next section introduces the 
property theory framework for readers unfamiliar with the idea of a tragedy of 
the anticommons. Then I briefly describe how that framework operates across 
the gradient of socialist property in transition. The following section shows how 
an anticommons property perspective can help explain the path of Russian en-
terprise transition. Finally, I explore the consequences of initial patterns of 
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share ownership, particularly the migration to manager domination and the sti-
fling of equity markets. Whether a corporate anticommons emerges in a devel-
oped or transition economy, and whether it lasts for a short or long period, so-
cieties can avoid its social costs by attending more to the patterns of initial share 
ownership.2 The difficulties of overcoming a tragedy of the anticommons sug-
gest that corporate governance theorists and policymakers should pay more at-
tention to rules for ameliorating the consequences of perverse share ownership 
during privatization and not just to the rules for subsequent share transactions. 
A New Tool for Corporate Governance Theory 
Private Property 
Corporate governance is often discussed within a property theory framework 
because the modern corporation is, of course, a highly particularized species of 
private property (Milhaupt 1998). Corporate private property may be contrasted 
with categories such as commons property and state property (Kennedy and 
Michelman 1980; Waldron 1985). Anti commons property has not figured in this 
typology.3 This section makes the anticommons more accessible for corporate 
governance theorists. 
Theorists usually note three elements to be essential in defining private 
property, each element with its corporate law counterpart: (1) Private property 
is understood as comprising a core bundle of rights chosen from the infinite re-
lations that may exist among people with respect to a scarce resource (Hohfeld 
1923; Honore 1961 ). The corporate form comprises one highly contingent form 
of private property, a bundle of rights and obligations established under the cor-
porate laws of each jurisdiction (Hansmann 1996). (2) Ownership of private 
property includes the possibility that an individual can control the core bundle, 
such that the owner's decision on use will be treated as relatively final by soci-
ety (Michelman 1982). On this point, the most distinctive element of corporate 
law is the separation of ownership by shareholders and control by managers 
(Grossman and Hart 1986). (3) Owners may break up the core bundle subject 
to constraints on fragmentation that keep objects available for productive use, 
in an alienable form, and with a clear decision-making hierarchy among own-
ers (Michelman 1982; Ellickson 1993). In corporate law, the key problem be-
comes how to structure the internal governance mechanism to align managers' 
decisions with shareholder interests (Hart and Moore 1990; Cheung 1983). 
Of course, even in settled market economies, the boundaries of the corpo-
ration may remain unclear despite the web of legal rules, institutions, and in-
formal norms (Barzel 1989). For example, one current corporate law debate 
concerns whether managers might consider the interests of nonowner "stake-
holders," such as labor and local communities, commensurate with their regard 
A Property Theory Perspective 291 
for stockholders (Oswald 1998). Ambiguity may arise because of a range of un-
resolved conflicts and changing values regarding ownership. Nevertheless, 
most workaday activities that require contact with corporations take place with-
out negotiation over the corporate rights and obligations that are constitutive of 
the property bundle. If people thought deeply about corporate ownership, per-
haps they would see that even its core meanings are historically contingent and 
indeterminate (Kelman 1987). However, our everyday experience of the cor-
poration masks its somewhat mysterious character. 
Anticommons Property 
Theorists have usually used the term commons property to describe a property 
regime that is not private property. For example, Michelman describes a com-
mons as "a scheme of universally distributed, all-encompassing privilege ... 
that is opposite to [private property]" (1982, 9). More generally, as Yoram 
Barzel notes, the standard economic analysis of property has "tended to clas-
sify ownership status into the categories all and none, the latter being termed 
'common property'-property that has no restrictions put on its use" (1989, 
71). Thus, property theory traditionally dichotomizes commons (nonprivate) 
property and private property. This dichotomy is too limited to capture the di-
versity of real-world property relations. More generally, property relations are 
better characterized as a triumvirate of commons, private, and anticommons. 
I define anticommons property as a property regime in which multiple 
owners hold effective rights of exclusion in a scarce resource. This definition 
departs from previous definitions along three dimensions: (1) Rights of exclu-
sion-Because others define an anticommons to include only situations in 
which everyone has a right to exclude (Michelman 1982, Ellickson 1993 ), they 
have missed the existence of real-world anti commons property, in which a lim-
ited group of owners have rights of exclusion. Nonuse can occur even when a 
few actors have rights of exclusion in a resource that each wants to use. (2) Im-
plication of nonuse-Although perpetual nonuse of property may be optimal 
in a few situations, there are more situations in which nonuse results but is not 
socially desirable. For most resources that people care about, some level of use 
is preferable to nonuse, and an anticommons regime is a threat to, rather than 
the epitome of, productive use. (3) Formality of rights-Multiple rights of ex-
clusion need not be formally granted through the legal system for anticommons 
property to emerge. 
The Tragedy of the Anticommons 
Like the familiar tragedy of the commons, resources held in anti commons form 
are prone to waste. The tragedy of the commons is that rational individuals, act-
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ing separately, may collectively overconsume scarce resources. Each individ-
ual finds that she benefits by consumption, even though her use imposes rela-
tively larger costs on the community. Using my definition, an anticommons is 
prone to the inverse tragedy. A tragedy of the anticommons can occur when too 
many individuals may exclude each other from a scarce resource. The right to 
exclude is valuable precisely because others want to use the resource and will 
pay something to collect the right. The tragedy is that rational individuals, act-
ing separately, may collectively waste resources by underconsuming them 
(even after accounting for effects on the environment, neighbors, and future 
generations). 
By itself, the appearance of anticommons property-such as fragmented 
corporate ownership-is not necessarily a problem for the efficient use of re-
sources.4 In a world without transaction costs, owners should rearrange initial 
endowments through ex-post bargaining in markets (Coase 1960).5 Such bar-
gains would put resources to productive use, perhaps by bundling anti commons 
rights into private property. Of course, we do not live in a transaction-costless 
world, as Ronald Coase (1988) recognized. If many people can block each other 
from using a resource, they must incur at least the transaction costs of identi-
fying and bargaining with each other to put the resource back to use. These 
transaction costs may result in ownership remaining fragmented and resources 
being wasted. 
The reasons why individuals fail to reach Coasian bargains vary with the 
resource: sometimes the transaction costs of locating counterparts, bargaining, 
and enforcing deals prove to be prohibitive; other times agency costs, cognitive 
biases, or heterogeneous interests among owners preclude deals. The real-world 
effect of multiple rights to use an object or multiple rights to exclude others 
from use is not a theoretical absolute, but is instead an empirical matter. Ex-
pectations about overuse or underuse of property, and our policy responses, 
must be grounded in experience and observation. 
Anticommons Property in Transition 
The Gradient of Property Reform 
Socialist legal systems organized property in a fundamentally different way 
from private property systems (Feldbrugge 1993; Gray, Hanson, and Heller 
1992). For example, socialist law did not have the legal concept of limited lia-
bility corporations with privately held share ownership or of real estate defined 
as land and those things permanently affixed to it. Instead, the state owned all 
key economic assets-"the means of production" -indivisibly with no right of 
alienation. For administrative convenience, the government allocated complex 
use rights to state organizations. In resolving conflicts among users of state 
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property, dispute-settlement mechanisms accorded primacy to state socialist 
expediency, rather than to abstract legal principles. Legal tools such as share 
registries for corporations or land registries for real estate did not have any place 
in socialist law. 6 
The absence of corporations or real estate as legal categories suggests 
three elements that distinguished socialist law from market legal systems and 
set the stage for the emergence of an anticommons during postsocialist transi-
tion: (I) Hierarchy-While market legal systems tend to dichotomize among 
types of property (for example, real and personal, or tangible and intangible) 
and to focus on the scope of individual rights, socialist law categorized prop-
erty according to the type or identity of the owner (Gray et a!. 1993). State so-
cialist property was at the top, followed by cooperative and personal property 
in decreasing order of protection (Mozolin 1993). (2) Objects-The category 
of socialist property included the objects of greatest economic value in social-
ist society. Because all productive assets were in principle "unitary" and be-
longed to "the people as a whole," socialist law did not delineate corporate, 
physical, or legal boundaries in a way that would be familiar or functional in a 
private property regime (Butler 1983). (3) Ownership-Instead of assigning a 
single owner to each object, socialist law created a complex hierarchy of di-
vided, coordinated rights loosely comparable to familiar Western forms of trust 
ownership (Feldbrugge 1993). Central-planning mechanisms coordinated uses; 
state arbitration courts, formally, and the Communist Party, informally, re-
solved conflicts. Thus, most valuable assets in socialist countries began the 
transition to markets with indistinct boundaries and overlapping ownership. 
When property is organized along the hierarchy of socialist legal protec-
tion, a notable trend emerges: the starting point for ownership matters. Within 
a given national regime, the more protection property received under socialist 
law, the less successful its performance has been in a new market economy; 
conversely, property with less socialist law protection has performed more vi-
brantly.7 It is difficult for existing transition literature to explain this inverse 
correlation between protection and performance. For example, the level of ad-
ministrative corruption, judicial incapacity, and clarity of rights is reasonably 
consistent across types of property within any given postsocialist market. Yet 
residential property, which received relatively less protection under socialist 
law, appears to be performing better than corporate property, which received 
relatively more-even if the two forms of property occupy identical physical 
spaces (compare Struyk 1996 with World Bank 1996). 
Poorly performing anticommons property is most likely to appear and per-
sist in resources that begin transition with the most fragmented ownership 
(Heller 1998). In contrast, private property emerges more successfully in re-
sources that begin transition with a single owner holding a near-standard bun-
dle of market legal rights. In such resources, the transition from a socialist to a 
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market economy occurs more smoothly. Each point along the gradient of prop-
erty in transition suggests lessons about the nature of anticommons property 
and possible routes to rebundling it as private property. The following section 
notes just one point on the gradient, a point useful for understanding puzzles in 
postsocialist corporate governance. 
Case Study of Empty Stores in Moscow 
Stores in socialist regimes were notoriously bare because of an economic pol-
icy that disfavored production of consumer goods. 8 Although the transition to 
markets took root in the early 1990s and storefronts were privatized, many 
storefronts in Moscow unfortunately remained empty during subsequent years. 
On the streets in front of these empty stores, however, new entrepreneurs set up 
thousands of metal kiosks that they rapidly filled with goods. 9 Kiosk merchants 
negotiated around the anticommons regime through corruption agreements 
with local government rights-holders and protection arrangements with ma-
fia.10 By routinizing corruption, kiosk entrepreneurs quickly reduced the trans-
action costs of assembling quasi-private bundles of rights: 
Regular payments must be made to local officials and a powerful 
mafia .... "You have to pay bribes to get financing," [Karlamov, a kiosk 
owner,] said. "You have to pay bribes to get permission to put your kiosk 
up on a promising site. And even after things are all set up, you have to 
pay bribes to make sure they don't close you down. The mafia is the eas-
iest of all to deal with. They don't charge too much, they tell you exactly 
what they want up front, and when an agreement is made, they live up to 
it. They don't come back asking for more .... The hardest part was find-
ing out who was the right person to bribe," he explained. "At first, we had 
no idea who could do what, so we began visiting the local prefect's office 
almost every day. We gave candy and other presents to people we met 
there, and eventually they directed us to people who could help." (Gal-
lagher 1993, I) 
Creation of commercial space through corruption and mafia protection can 
be reasonably stable over time when procedures become routinized and entre-
preneurs come to rely on formal forbearance and informal ex-post assembly of 
anti commons rights into private property rights. The presence of kiosks can be 
seen as a visual and analytic indicator for measuring a transition country's 
progress from anticommons to private property in the real estate sector. 11 In 
Poland, for example, anticommons property in commercial real estate lasted 
less than a year before kiosks disappeared. Why were Moscow merchants 
slower in moving from kiosks into stores? The answer lies partly in the legal 
regime surrounding commercial real estate. 12 
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Within the legal and institutional context of the Moscow storefront, the 
main actors were a wide variety of state and quasi-state organizations. In a 
monograph on commercial real estate markets in Russia, April Harding (1995) 
notes that the initial assignments of state property to different levels of gov-
ernment were opaque and varied. Local and regional government agencies 
emerged as the key players, with nearly monopolistic control over property 
such as commercial real estate. Privatization ratified some existing socialist and 
informal use rights while it superimposed a new set of market ownership rights. 
As a result, in postsocialist Russia, a heterogeneous set of owners have been 
thrown together in any given store. No owner in the new market economy held 
a bundle of rights that resembled any of the wide range of workable bundles 
that appear in well-functioning market economies. 
There are some further complexities for transition in Moscow storefronts. 
First, multiple parties may share most rights. In this example, multiple owners 
must agree among themselves to exercise their "ownership stick" in the prop-
erty bundle. Second, local government agencies may be distinguished from the 
bureaucrats who occupy decision-making roles and control use of the property. 
Officials may exchange leases at below-market rents for bribes. Even if only 
one party opposes use, that party may be able to block others from exercising 
their rights. The Moscow storefront thus meets my definition of anticommons 
property. The tragedy of the storefront anticommons is that owners waste the 
resource when they fail to agree on any economic use. Empty stores result in 
forgone economic opportunity and lost jobs. As of 1995, about 95 percent of 
commercial real estate in Russia remained in divided local ownership, and 
much was unused (Rapaczynski 1996). 
Over time, store by store, entrepreneurial property bundlers may convert 
an anticommons by negotiating with all the holders of rights of exclusion. In-
deed, evidence suggests that this process is happening already in Russia. 13 
However, the market route to bundling rights might fail altogether if the trans-
action costs of bundling exceed the gains from conversion, or if holdouts block 
bundling. 14 The alternative route to bundling is for government to intervene by 
redefining and reallocating property rights. Local governments could exert more 
control over their subordinate agencies and transfer rights to or consolidate rights 
in the equivalent of a "sole owner," a single public decision maker able to act as 
an owner on behalf of the local government. However, existing rights-holders, 
including local government agencies and the private actors who have invested 
in reliance on the current property regime, may cling tenaciously to their rights. 
At an extreme, transition governments might defend badly designed property 
rights and then wait for the market to sort out the problems, or they might inter-
vene radically in the market and undermine investor confidence. 15 
Why do ground-floor stores often remain empty while physically identi-
cal apartments above are actively traded and kiosks flourish out on the streets 
in front? The different outcomes may be summarized in part by three factors 
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relating to the transaction costs of bundling and strategic behaviors of owners 
locked in bilateral monopolies: ( 1) Public or private owner-The transaction 
costs of negotiating with private mafia may be lower than those of negotiating 
among state and corporate parties. (2) Number and homogeneity of owners-
There are fewer owners with more homogeneous interests in kiosks than in 
stores and enterprises, with the result that transaction costs are lower. (3) Prop-
erty boundaries-Even without formal title registries, people generally seem 
to agree on the limits of kiosk ownership, which constitutes the core object of 
value. By contrast, enterprise and store boundaries are not as transparent. A sin-
gle bakery, a chain of bakeries, or all local retail stores may constitute the rel-
evant object of property over which parties can negotiate. 
The lessons of the Moscow storefront are strikingly parallel to the prob-
lems emerging with corporate ownership. For each point along the property 
gradient, governments are tempted to create anticommons property, perhaps to 
respond to pressure by existing stakeholders or to address short-term distribu-
tional concerns. Rather than assigning a usable bundle in a scarce resource to a 
sole owner, governments may assign rights in an object to multiple owners, so 
that many people can get a piece of each pie. After initial entitlements are set, 
institutions and interests coalesce around them, with the result that the path to 
well-functioning private property may be blocked and scarce resources may be 
wasted. 16 
The Path of Russian Corporate Governance 
A Transition Puzzle 
Enterprise reform has been the most discussed, and most puzzling, point in the 
literature on the transition from socialism. 17 After the fall of the Soviet system, 
state enterprises were rapidly privatized, stock markets created, and corporate 
legal institutions adopted. Yet in 1994, the total stock market capitalization of 
all of Russian industry, based on voucher auctions, was under $12 billion-
about equal to that of Kellogg Corp., a single U.S. cereal firm (Boycko, Shleifer, 
and Vishny 1995, 1 I 7). Oil stocks were twenty to thirty times cheaper per bar-
rel relative to their proven reserves than the stocks of their Western counter-
parts. Even at their peak in the fall of 1997, the prices of Russian shares still 
left total capitalization at a trivial fraction of the apparent value of the underly-
ing corporate assets controlled by these Russian corporations. By the summer 
of 1998, "the Moscow Times index of 50 leading shares hit an all-time bottom, 
lower than its starting level four years ago" (Daigle 1998). 
While comparisons among transition economies are risky, the differences 
in corporate performance are so striking as to merit notice. For example, China 
has experienced tremendous economic growth, particularly among "township 
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and village enterprises" (TVEs), apparently without "clearly defined" property 
rights (Li 1996). By 1995, these TVEs employed perhaps 300 million people, 
about 50 percent of total employment in rural nonprivate enterprises (Jin and 
Qian 1998). While analysts such as Andrei Shleifer (1994) suggest that clari-
fying rights will prove essential to continued growth, the anticommons per-
spective suggests that clarifying property rights may be only part of the story. 
Political and fiscal decentralization in China may have kept the core bundle of 
property rights relatively intact at the local level, so that the current process of 
TVE privatization may not lead to anticommons tragedy (see Pan and Park 
1998). Even though rights are not clearly defined, perhaps a sole decision maker 
can exercise effective control over assets of each TVE. If further research con-
firms this hypothesis about Chinese enterprise reform, the content of control 
rights may be even more important than the clarity of those rights during tran-
sition. 
The anticommons prism might usefully reflect on this divergence in cor-
porate performance. If so, then the image of empty storefronts may not be an 
idiosyncratic artifact of early postsocialist transition, but rather a window into 
a more widespread phenomenon. Transition policy might focus more on the 
particulars of property bundling during political decentralization and enterprise 
privatization, the paths by which anticommons property is either formed or 
avoided. In particular, perhaps the fragmentation of ownership of the Russian 
firm helps to explain the slow pace of change. Privatization broke up the so-
cialist bundle of corporate governance rights among a heterogeneous set of 
managers, workers, and local governments (Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny 
1995). As discussed below, these new owners were given excessive rights of 
exclusion, such that no one could decide affirmatively to restructure the firm, 
and each could prevent the others from redeploying corporate assets in a value-
enhancing direction. To gain support for rapid privatization from socialist-era 
stakeholders, Russia may have transferred socialist ownership at the state level 
to anticommons ownership at the corporate level. 
Enterprise Privatization as Insider Buy-Out 
Russian enterprises have a long history of insider management control. During 
the Soviet era, the decisions reached by "general director" were disciplined to 
an extent by central planning and ministry supervision. Beginning with late 
Gorbachev reforms and early Yeltsin reforms, central ministries loosened their 
control but they failed to select any outside monitor as a replacement. General 
directors recognized that to run their enterprises they needed a single decision-
making owner, and many decided that they indeed were that owner. 18 
Before firms were privatized, they went through an intermediate step 
called corporatization, in which the enterprise was formally created as an in-
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corporated business unit with a separate legal identity, a board of directors, se-
nior management, share ownership, and a notional economic value ascribed to 
its assets (Blasi et a!. 1997). When a firm was corporatized, 100 percent of its 
stock was still owned by the state, but central ministries lost control, and the 
firm was poised for privatization. During this preprivatization stage, the board 
of directors of the firm explicitly divided control among the general director, 
rank-and-file workers, and the local and federal governments. While employ-
ees elected the senior management, they rarely exercised this power in anything 
but the most nominal sense. By cooperating with the workers, managers posi-
tioned themselves to keep control of the firm at privatization. 
Russia's mass privatization program of 1992-94 transferred more than 
15,000 medium and large state firms to private ownership with "a speed that is 
quite unprecedented in the postcommunist world" (Frydman, Pistor, and Ra-
paczynski 1996). These firms employed over 17 million workers and managers 
and included the bulk of the Russian industrial core, except for a few categories 
of firms, such as energy, defense, and infrastructure. 19 By 1996, when the 
big wave of privatization was over, 77 percent of medium and large state en-
terprises were privatized, accounting for 88 percent of industrial output (Blasi 
et al. 1997, 25). 
Although the mass privatization used vouchers and formally created open 
stock ownership, the program "was basically a management-employee buyout 
program because of its preferential treatment of managers and workers" (WDR 
1996, 5). Insiders had several privatization options. About one-quarter of en-
terprises chose the option that gave minority employee ownership for free. 
Nearly all the rest chose the option that allowed managers and workers to ac-
quire 51 percent of the firm for extremely low prices. 20 After insiders bought 
shares, each citizen could bid for some of the remaining shares at auctions us-
ing vouchers they were given. Immediately after privatization, insiders typi-
cally owned about two-thirds of the shares of firms privatized under the second 
option, noted above. On average, managers owned 9 percent and workers about 
56 percent (WDR 1996, 55; Frydman, Pistor, and Rapaczynski 1996, 189). Out-
siders obtained about 20 to 30 percent, split between investment funds and in-
dividual investors. Various government agencies retained the remainder of 
shares. 
For example, the city of Moscow now runs 1 ,500 businesses, and "in an-
other 300 firms, the city is a partner with outside investors. The businesses in-
clude bakeries, hotels, construction, publishing, banking, aviation, and com-
munications firms, beauty salons, an oil refinery, and a pair of giant, troubled 
automobile factories" (Hoffman 1997, AI). Local governments also retain con-
trol of the land on which enterprises are located, an even more important prob-
lem for corporate transition, given the anti commons perspective introduced ear-
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lier in this chapter. As one reporter notes, "Many companies seeking to get a 
clearer title to their land still face stiff resistance from regional authorities who 
see land ownership as a source of power in dealing with local enterprises" 
(Larsen 1996). 
Postprivatization, senior managers invoked numerous mechanisms to thwart 
employee and outsider control. These mechanisms included, for example, keep-
ing share registries locked up in their offices and refusing to acknowledge own-
ership by people they disfavored, threatening to fire workers who sold shares to 
outsiders, and stock dilutions aimed at outsider shareholders. As Andrei Shleifer 
and Dmitri Vasiliev said, "Old guard managers, who supported privatization in 
exchange for assurances that they would keep their jobs and full array of perks, 
are desperately fighting back. Some managers physically threaten challengers 
at shareholder meetings, rig shareholder votes or illegally change corporate 
charters" (Landry 1994). Even voucher investment funds, which are the most 
aggressive and informed outside shareholders, often cannot get even rudimen-
tary information about the firms they own and instead "resort to spying on their 
own companies" (Frydman and Rapaczynski 1994, 204). Although managers 
did not acquire a majority of shares during the initial privatization, they have 
often been able to lock up control that cannot be dislodged. 
Workers who did acquire majority share ownership did not achieve any-
thing like a "workers' democracy." Instead, they remained locked in an uneasy 
arrangement with management, able to block restructuring but not able to seize 
control. While insider ownership has begun to decline, from 65 percent in 1993 
to about 56 percent in 1995, the problems of majority insider ownership remain 
endemic. By 1996, the typical board contained four managers, one state repre-
sentative, and two outside shareholders (WDR 1996; Blasi eta!. 1997, 99). Be-
cause only five directors were required to make decisions, the insiders and the 
state representative could always prevail if they cooperated. According to the 
EBRD Transition Report (1997): 
In over 65% of Russia's 18,000 privatized medium-sized and large firms, 
management and employees have majority ownership, whereas non-state 
outsiders control only 20% of these companies. While in the top I 00 
largest companies outsiders have an ownership stake well above the aver-
age, the wide dispersion of these shareholdings often ensures a controlling 
position for the management. Insiders typically focus more on maintain-
ing control over their firms than on restructuring. Maintenance of "pocket" 
share registrars (i.e. registrars controlled by the firm), manipulation of vot-
ing procedures and obstacles to board representation of outside share-
holders have been widely used as defence mechanisms to preserve insider 
control. 
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The Consequences of Initial Conditions 
The prices of publicly traded Russian corporations are so absurdly low that they 
evidence more than just poor performance in a difficult economic environment. 
These low prices suggest that corporate governance problems are an important 
contributory factor to poor performance. The share price of a listed corporation 
represents a market estimate of the value of holding its shares as a noncontrol 
outsider. In the case of the typical Russian corporation, share prices are only a 
small fraction of a pro rata claim on what appears to be the future potential cash 
flow of the firm. This is because of the high probability that the firm's underly-
ing assets will be grossly mismanaged and that whatever cash flow is produced 
will be diverted to benefit insiders or reinvested in unproductive projects. Such 
concentrated insider ownership is unique to Russia among all the important 
economies of the world. This initial condition may prove decisive in under-
standing whether the corporate governance system converges to either the 
American stock market or European bank-centered approach (Milhaupt 1998; 
Bebchuk and Roe 1998). 
The anticommons perspective suggests two failures associated with the 
Russian pattern of initial share ownership. The first failure is that the three 
groups of insiders are unable to work together to operate their firms in a way 
that would lead to even their own joint benefit. They tend to view their shares 
more as control rights than as financial instruments. Each group has, despite 
privatization, continued to focus primarily on how each firm could be run in a 
way that would most benefit it directly. For management, this has meant ex-
tensive perquisites and diversionary business deals involving themselves and 
their associates. For labor, this has been continued employment of redundant 
workers with attendant (minimal) social protection. For regional government 
entities, this has been continued provision by the firm of public services to the 
community. Again, the relationship between privatized enterprises and the 
Moscow government provides a stark example, with the insiders using enter-
prise land as the basis for a "cozy relationship [that] is multiplied a thousand 
times .... The property was leased for a nominal sum, but the city also made 
unwritten demands not in the lease: to plant trees, rebuild a hospital, pave a 
highway" (Hoffman 1997, A I). 
Each group, in agreeing to the policies desired by the other groups as the 
price of getting the policy it desires for itself, has acted in a way that ignores 
the effect of such an arrangement on the financial value of their shares. Or, in 
terms of anticommons theory, each group blocks restructuring by exercising 
low-cost vetoes, and in exchange extracts a minimal level of benefits from firm 
assets. From a social perspective, corporate assets are wasted in low-value uses, 
producing returns far below the performance that might be expected by com-
parison with Poland, China, or any other peer group of transition economies. In 
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terms of the above example, the particular enterprises in Moscow that planted 
the trees, rebuilt the hospital, or paved the highway are unlikely to be effective 
providers of such services; indeed, provision of such services may be incom-
patible with the firm's economic viability. 
The second failure is that the three groups run the firm in a way that is par-
ticularly disadvantageous to outsider shareholders. The primitive state of the 
Russian legal system and the general lack of corporate transparency means that 
outside shareholders gain no real protection from the fiduciary duties nominally 
placed on managers and only weak protection from procedural rules designed 
to police against interested transactions. Thus the fact that the insiders are in 
the majority crushes what would otherwise be the only meaningful constraints 
on their behavior: the ability of outsiders to vote out the board and the hostile 
takeover threat. From the anticommons perspective, outside property bundlers 
cannot unify ownership in corporate assets and then redeploy those assets in 
value-increasing uses. 
A Comment on Black and Kraakman 
The main, recent corporate law reform-passed in 1996 and inspired partly by 
American law professors Bernard Black and Reinier Kraakman (1996)-was 
intended to respond precisely to the problem of insider domination that 
emerged from the initial privatization scheme and immediate postprivatization 
enterprise behavior. For example, the new corporate law attempted to improve 
the position of minority outside shareholders by mandating cumulative voting. 
Also, significant transactions in which insiders are interested are supposed to 
be approved by separate votes of the outside shareholders. Nevertheless, the 
new corporate law does not really get at the problem of multiple groups of in-
siders unable to cooperate even to maximize their own joint wealth. The law's 
procedural approach, which does not rely heavily on court enforcement, goes 
a long way toward creating a viable corporate governance regime. However, 
these reforms alone are unlikely to protect outsiders sufficiently to make pub-
lic equity finance possible even when firms have made the transition to man-
agement control. Instead, the problems associated with insider blocks may re-
quire a more substantive approach. 
For example, Black and Kraakman ( 1996) sensibly suggested neutralizing 
the voting rights of local governments, which make up one of the competing 
blocks of insiders and which are unlikely to use their rights to maximize share-
holder wealth. But the suggestion to sterilize shares of local government own-
ers applies with equal force to management and labor blocks-perhaps an eco-
nomically sensible reform, but certainly a politically impossible one. Rules on 
disinterested ownership could also be used to take control of the board away 
from the initial group of insiders and increase the value of being an outside 
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shareholder. Insiders could profit more from increased share value than from 
diverting opportunities from the firm. While changing management and labor 
shares into nonvoting form may be infeasible and imprudent after privatization 
has been completed, the consequences of bad initial decisions may become 
more salient as the losses associated with the current system mount. 
Later amendments to the 1996 corporate law attempted to address some 
of these concerns, but these revisions have not been effective: "Critics said the 
legislation fails to attack the real problem-insider dealing-and doubt any-
thing but better information disclosure requirements and an understanding of 
basic ethics will help the situation. In Russia, company directors and managers 
are routinely accused of insider dealing, which includes everything from ac-
cepting bribes to acting against their company's interests to selling assets or 
shares to relatives or friends" (Daigle 1998). In a system that starts with com-
peting blocks of insiders, the anticommons perspective suggests that tinkering 
with voting rules will not put corporations on the path to equity-driven re-
structuring. Even Black and Kraakman have recently disowned many of their 
initial optimistic predictions for the role that corporate law could play in im-
proving Russian enterprise performance (Black, Kraakman, and Tarassova 
2000) 
The Consequences of Insider Domination 
Russian enterprise privatization closely parallels storefront privatization. For 
both, the path taken represents not only political expediency, but also the pri-
macy of neoclassical economists over experts sensitive to the particularities of 
law and economics and to the bargaining implications of packaging rights. In 
each, the pure economists wanted to privatize as quickly as possible. They 
hoped that simply by getting interests into private hands, markets would estab-
lish mechanisms by which assets would migrate to the control of persons who 
would put them to best use. But reformers failed to consider the dynamics of 
anticommons ownership. The anticommons perspective suggests two main 
consequences that result from initial insider domination during corporate pri-
vatization: a path to insider domination and the stifling of equity market devel-
opment (see Fox and Heller 2000). 
This section discusses these consequences by drawing on anecdotal evi-
dence-a second-best solution in a data-constrained environment. The next 
step will be rigorous empirical testing of the arguments advanced here, but 
study design for such a project is daunting. As noted at the beginning of this 
chapter, current macroeconomic and other factors may swamp the subtle effects 
of corporate governance rules on enterprise performance. Also, managers have 
strong incentives to hide precisely the crucial information that surveys or case 
studies would seek to capture: actual levels of share ownership and indirect con-
A Property Theory Perspective 303 
trol by insiders, rates and mechanisms of skimming of corporate opportunities, 
deal-making among insiders that cuts out shareholders, and real accounting in-
formation on firm performance. There is quite a substantial and growing body 
of empirical data on enterprises in Russia's transition, but none that is yet on 
point for pinning down the arguments advanced below. 
The Path to Manager Control 
The first expected consequence of the initial pattern of share ownership is that 
the dispersed allocation will not be sustainable over time. More specifically, as 
seems to have been the case with Moscow storefronts, the direction of owner-
ship patterns will likely be that increasing numbers of firms will be taken over 
by one group of insiders, particularly the managers who can squeeze out other 
insiders and minority outside owners. This result can be predicted when sub-
stantial value remains within privatized enterprises, but the multiple groups of 
insiders are unable to make joint wealth-maximizing agreements regarding cor-
porate assets. Where the insiders completely block one another, the assets may 
be wasted in a tragedy of the anticommons, but if one party can effectively ex-
clude the others, then they may be able to unlock some of the value hidden 
within privatized firms, though at a suboptimal level because of the need for se-
crecy when transactions are formally illegal. 
1. The Insider Game. The old managers have proven to be best positioned 
to wrest control from all other comers. Indeed, as one commentator notes, 
"Most Russian enterprises are still run by red directors-former communists 
who stack their boards with old-regime subordinates or cronies, bully workers 
into selling their shares back to management, and deny outside shareholders ac-
cess to their books, boardrooms, and shop floors. Many consolidate control of 
their companies by issuing large blocks of new shares to company insiders, of-
ten at bargain basement prices" (Kranz 1997, 60). With weak formal corporate 
legal systems, insider managers devise ever more effective measures to en-
trench control by excluding labor and local government insiders and by dilut-
ing or eliminating ownership by outside shareholders: "New tricks ... range 
from diluting the ownership stake of investors to such simple ploys as erasing 
the names of outside investors from computerized shareholder lists" (Galuszka 
and Kranz 1995). 
From a narrow economic standpoint, the likelihood that managers-even 
bad managers-will take more control may not seem so troubling: by seizing 
control, these managers can overcome the tragedy of the anticommons and be-
gin to operate the corporate assets in more value-maximizing ways, as if the as-
sets were their sole private property. In this sense, concentrated manager con-
trol is a more stable ownership pattern and represents a social gain because the 
managers are more motivated to put assets and cash flow to productive uses-
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leaving aside the unsettling distributive and social implications that manager 
domination expresses. Even from an efficiency perspective, however, the man-
agement control equilibrium is still far from ideal, and its shortcomings repre-
sent large continued failings in the Russian system of corporate governance, es-
pecially because managers have continued to divert rather than restructure 
assets. For example, the EBRD Transition Report (1997) notes: 
Enterprise restructuring has hitherto been achieved mainly through 
changes in the product mix, shedding of labour through attrition, expanded 
use of unpaid leave or reduced hours. Deeper restructuring in the form of 
factory shutdowns, changes in management, major reorganisations and 
modernisation is a very early stage and is constrained by, among other fac-
tors, limited access to investment resources. Recent evidence suggests that 
roughly 25% of the medium-sized and large companies are engaged in se-
rious restructuring, many of them being members of Financial and Indus-
trial Groups (FIGs). About half of the medium-sized and large companies 
have not as yet undertaken any meaningful restructuring. 
Often the managers' aims have been achieved by extralegal means that are 
difficult to legitimate and have the collateral consequence of demoralizing la-
bor and antagonizing local governments. Indeed, it may be premature to con-
clude that managers will ultimately prevail in the dynamic game of insider 
consolidation. By diverting the spoils of the enterprise away from local gov-
ernments, managers can go too far, spurring local governments to shift the 
venue of competition. Every firm that fails to keep current with crushing local 
and regional tax obligations-a ubiquitous problem-opens itself to formal 
sanction by squeezed out local bureaucrats. In a surprising recent twist, with 
perhaps wide-ranging implications, local and regional governments have be-
gun forcing resident companies into bankruptcy as part of a program to collect 
back taxes-when informal revenue dries up, then these governments appear 
to be turning to formal mechanisms. But the bankruptcy seems not to lead to a 
sale ofthe enterprise and its assets to produce cash that satisfies the firm's debts. 
Rather, it appears that local and regional governments may be deploying these 
legal actions as an indirect route to an effective renationalization of privatized 
enterprises. Although data are sketchy, sub rosa renationalizations appear con-
centrated in firms that produce substantial cash flows, such as oil companies. 
For example, Kranz notes, "In regions across Russia, both local governments 
and creditors have filed bankruptcy suits against subsidiaries of Potanin's 
Sidanko Oil. The suits ostensibly seek payment of back taxes and delinquent 
energy bills. But the real prize could be Sidanko's oil assets" (1998, 44). 
Local and regional governments, when cut out from the insider game, 
seem willing to strike back, and they have relatively effective legal J:ools to do 
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so; similarly, it is possible that employees could enter the game, though the tools 
available to them-such as strikes-require substantial efforts at collective ac-
tion with less certain payoffs. In this struggle among insiders, the new equilib-
rium will take considerable time to reach and often will not put assets in the 
hands of those most capable of using them. 
2. Deterring Outsider Investment. Early trends suggest that the best im-
provement in corporate performance in Russia comes when firms have sub-
stantial outside ownership and those owners place outside directors on the 
board (for example, see the Baltika Brewing case study in Fox and Heller 2000). 
This observation may be causally backward, however, in that outsiders tend to 
invest in the best firms, particularly those that are generating sufficient positive 
cash flow that payment of dividends becomes possible. One collateral conse-
quence of the insider game is that outside owners, who may play a crucial role 
in disciplining corporate managers, will not appear, either through public eq-
uity offerings or through private purchases. One much-discussed example has 
been the huge, ailing ZiL truck plant in Moscow. Rather than bring in outside 
investors and benefit from their access to capital and technical expertise, inside 
management has allied itself with the local Moscow government, particularly 
the current mayor, and both together have continued to run the firm into the 
ground, producing trucks that are hopelessly uncompetitive. Outside share-
holders found they had little recourse as their investment was progressively 
squandered. According to one of many such reports, share owners "realized 
that, despite the municipal and federal authorities' special treatment of this flag-
ship of the automotive industry, the enterprise was a hopeless failure, and they 
tried to exert some direct influence on the situation [but this] proved to be not 
such an easy thing" (Berger and Dokuchayev 1996). 
Even faced with the most aggressive outside investors, insiders have been 
successful at undercutting their control. Examples abound. Recently, in a trans-
action allowed by Russian regulators, "the Moscow City Telephone Network, 
or MGTS, [announced that it] is planning to increase its authorized capital by 
50 percent, handing the shares over to a single shareholder linked to the 
Moscow city government for next to nothing" (Baker-Said 1998). At Lebedin-
sky Mining and Processing Plant, a company on top of one of Europe's largest 
iron ore deposits, outsiders were about to buy 30 percent of the company's 
shares during privatization. But then, "after a series of quarrels, Lebedinsky 
managers barred [the outside owners] from the annual shareholder's meeting 
... While the [outsiders] cooled their heels ... , the company's board approved 
a share issue that cut the [outsiders'] stake from 30% to 5%. Since then Lebe-
dinsky managers have ignored an arbitration-court ruling that the issue was il-
legal" (Kranz 1997, 60). 
Similarly, in an ongoing saga, insider owners of Sidanko Oil have repeat-
edly mistreated outsider shareholders and investors. According to one account, 
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"Sidanko outraged 10 percent owner British Petroleum Co. and foreign invest-
ment funds that own 4 percent of Sidanko stock by restricting the sale of a con-
vertible bond issue to affiliates of [insider owners]. (The sale was reportedly at 
a tenth of the bonds' estimated market price.)" (Fairlamb and Ivanov 1998; 
Whalen 1998). In early 1998, the Russian Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion blocked one attempted dilution, virtually the only time during the transi-
tion that minority shareholders were so protected by a public regulatory body-
and only then because the minority shareowners were foreign investment funds 
with access to Western media. Since 1998, Sidanko's insider owners have taken 
even more drastic action and are now completing a move to push out BP 
Amoco, the strategic investor that had invested over $500 million for its stake 
(Higgins 1999, A 15). Whether insider dealing favors management or local gov-
ernments, outside minority shareholders and strategic investors are equally 
driven out. In response, and over time, outsiders may become relatively less 
willing to make investments, even in natural resources and telecommunications 
companies with strong cash flows, despite the possibilities for substantial syn-
ergies and the firms' need for new technology and investment capital. 
When multiple insiders block each other, there is little commitment by 
insiders to the financial aspects of share ownership. Similarly, when manager 
insiders take control and divert assets illegally, outside investors have little in-
centive to purchase minority interests. The question for Russian corporate 
transition is whether privatized enterprises can systematically move in the di-
rection of increasing outsider ownership and control, but the anticommons per-
spective would suggest migration in the wrong direction. 
Constraints on Equity Market Development 
The second consequence of initial ownership patterns is that there will continue 
to be severe limits on the emergence and development of equity financing mar-
kets. The ability of insiders to divert wealth from any existing or potential out-
side shareholders makes raising capital through public sales of equity virtually 
impossible. Instead firms must rely solely on internally generated cash flows, 
which are not particularly likely to match value-enhancing investment needs. 
From industry to industry, managers appear to be taking the same shortsighted 
approach: looting companies rather than ensuring continued access to capital 
markets for new investment. As one commentator notes: 
All the infrastructure in the world can't bring an ounce of liquidity to the 
market if directors do not want to have their shares bought and sold freely. 
More often than not, directors do little more than give lip-service to the 
ideal of a liquid secondary market for their shares. They smile and shake 
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hands when analysts and potential investors come knocking, but when the 
tough questions concern financial transparency and corporate gover-
nance-such as accountability-they start grumbling. The reluctance of 
many directors to use the stock market for their benefit is a paradox: Af-
ter all, an overwhelming majority of directors managed to grab sizeable 
portions of equity in their companies during the wild privatization years 
of 1993 and 1994 .... Were directors to understand the virtue of share-
holder value, they could help make themselves even richer. (Peach 1998) 
Because managers waste corporate assets by diverting corporate opportu-
nities, firms have a low value on equity markets. In turn, managers are unwill-
ing to trade control for the small amounts of financing that outsiders will offer. 
Also, the absence of outside investor voice in firm management reduces the 
likelihood that corporate assets will be used even in the best interests of the 
management insiders. Outside owners, either shareholders or banks, cannot 
play a role as monitors of management performance, particularly over man-
agers who are incompetent holdovers from the socialist era. In one striking and 
odd report, "one company director ... owned over 51 percent of a company, 
... yet took personal bribes of about $10,000 to push through decisions that 
robbed the company of millions. Obviously, this man doesn't understand what 
he's doing" (Daigle 1998). 
One particularly disastrous consequence of constraints on equity market 
development is that funds are not available for investment in new firms. First, 
because existing firms do not actively use equity markets, they do not generate 
positive externalities by creating the depth and liquidity necessary to support 
new firms coming to market. Also, the failure of existing equity markets means 
that there are no efficient mechanisms by which existing companies can release 
and recycle excess cash flow to new firms. In a well-functioning equity market, 
firms would pay out funds as dividends funds that they could not profitably rein-
vest, and such funds would then be available for reinvestment in new firms with 
higher rates of return. Instead, as the EBRD Transition Report (1997) notes, 
"The main source of the expansion of the private sector remains the privatisa-
tion process and the contraction of the state sector .... The creation of de novo 
businesses continues to lag far behind the pace typical for the central European 
countries and many newly established businesses continue to operate in the in-
formal economy." 
The final consequence of initial ownership allocations is that they continue 
to help drive capital flight. Privatization is intended to create wealth that is 
available for reinvestment in Russia, but the insider structure of corporate own-
ership instead stimulates capital flight. Diversifying risk through portfolio in-
vestment is impossible, so investments must be in controlling equity stakes un-
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der the current system. A system that starts with fragmented insider ownership 
has led to one where floating share equity is impossible and capital leaves Rus-
sia because of inadequate viable investment opportunities. 
Concluding Remarks 
The existing scholarly literature on comparative corporate governance reflects 
the range of dominant share ownership patterns in the United States, Western 
Europe, and Japan. It has not yet focused on the role of initial ownership struc-
tures at the time of privatization and the bargaining failures that may follow. 
We pay a high price when we overlook the effects of ownership structure on 
economic performance. 
This chapter seeks to begin filling this gap by highlighting the tragedy of 
the anticommons in Russian enterprise reform. Governments must take care to 
avoid creating anticommons property accidentally when they define new prop-
erty rights. With enterprises, as with storefronts, when there are too many com-
peting owners, and weak or nonexistent institutional structures to mediate their 
conflicting interests, then an anticommons tragedy may emerge, and the re-
source may be squandered. Neither markets nor subsequent regulation will re-
liably convert an anticommons into useful private property, even if rights are 
"clearly defined" and subject to the "rule of law." The experience of anticom-
mons property in Russian transition-from storefronts to enterprises-sug-
gests that the content of property ownership, and not just the clarity of rights, 
matters more than we have realized. 
NOTES 
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tions "The Path of Russian Corporate Governance" and "The Consequences of Insider 
Domination" are adapted from Merritt B. Fox and Michael A. Heller, Corporate Gov-
ernance Lessons from Russian Enterprise Fiascoes (New York University Law Review, 
forthcoming 2000), a research project supported by the William Davidson Institute 
(WDI) at the University of Michigan Business School and the Cook Endowment at the 
University of Michigan Law School. The views expressed are the responsibility of the 
author and do not necessarily reflect those of the IRIS Center, WDI, US AID, or the Uni-
versity of Michigan. 
1. This argument draws from and is substantially elaborated in Fox and Heller 2000. 
2. In a recent article, Rebecca Eisenberg and I extend the theory of anticommons 
property to explain puzzles in biomedical research in the United States. We identify an 
unintended consequence of the trend in biomedical patent policy to grant more rights to 
premarket research. Paradoxically, more fragmented premarket rights may stifle dis-
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covery of the commercial innovations that actually save lives (Heller and Eisenberg 
1998). 
3. Frank Michelman appears to be the first to use the term anti commons, though the 
source has been hard to pin down. A thorough search ofthe literature revealed few other 
uses (e.g., Dukeminier and Krier 1998; Ellickson 1993). 
4. For a standard law-and-economics definition of efficiency, see Posner 1998. 
5. There are many other reasons why anticommons property may not be tragic: 
some resources are most efficiently managed in anti commons form, just as some are of-
ten held in commons form (Ostrom 1990; Rose 1986). Also, property theorists have 
shown that the efficiency of a property regime cannot be derived ex ante from a limited 
set of axioms, such as the assumption of rational, self-interested individuals (Kennedy 
and Michelman 1980; see also Krier 1992; Rose 1990). 
6. While working for the World Bank in the early 1990s, I was often asked by Rus-
sian officials to help identify reform priorities in the housing sector and responded that 
property registries were among the highest priorities as they help clarify ownership, se-
cure finance, and enable taxation. 
7. The measure of performance is difficult to quantify given the available data. A 
comparison of Russian assets with similar assets in developed market economies, how-
ever, provides a useful proxy for the concept of performance. While this chapter focuses 
more on efficiency-related measures, comparing distributive outcomes is equally pos-
sible. 
8. For elaboration on the Moscow storefront case study, see Heller 1998, 633-47. 
9. Several reporters at the Moscow Times, including Ellen Barry and Adam Tanner, 
traced the rise and fall of Moscow kiosks in the transition years. These articles are avail-
able in Lexis-Nexis. 
10. Newspaper accounts of kiosk enterprises often provide colorful confirmation of 
the anticommons arguments in this chapter. For example, Shapiro (1993, A 15) notes that: 
[Andrei, a kiosk owner,] has had to bribe tax inspectors, pay protection money to 
mafia toughs and fork over "gifts" to officials whose approval is needed for a busi-
ness license .... To start his business Andrei needed to get a host of city officials-
firefighters, electricians, architects-to sign his permit request. ... When a date was 
set for delivery of the kiosk, Andrei and his partner took care of a key business mat-
ter: making peace with the "protection" racketeers who have carved Moscow up into 
fiefdoms and who punish those who resist. 
11. The kiosk system does not, however, generate the levels of economic activity that 
could be achieved by a well-functioning retail sector. Hernando de Soto ( 1989) argues 
that the vibrant informal economy should be viewed as an important contribution to the 
overall economic performance, rather than a drain. Second, and just as important, he 
contends that commentators should not mistake vibrancy for optimality, either along ef-
ficiency or distributive dimensions. The informal economy represents the triumph of in-
genuity in the face of bad law. De Soto argues that a better solution would be to create 
the "good law" that characterizes successful economies, such as property registries and 
inexpensive enforcement of long-term contracts. 
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12. One article reports: "All this buying and selling takes place on the street because 
the title to most stores is unclear or because stores are occupied by moribund state en-
terprises. The sidewalks were free and empty, so the new entrepreneurs moved in" (Lally 
1992). 
13. A stroll down Tverskaya, one of Moscow's central shopping streets, today shows 
relatively few empty storefronts compared with just a few years ago. 
14. Communal apartments (komunalkas) form a particularly poignant example of a 
tragedy of the anticommons, with property bundlers murdering elderly tenants who hold 
out against assembling their rooms into a marketable single-family apartment. Komu-
nalkas were a despised feature of Russian socialist life, one noted often in Soviet-era 
fiction (Bulgakov 1967; Zoshchenko 1963). 
15. Frank Michelman (1967) suggests a calculus of settlement and demoralization 
costs for use in deciding whether a government should compensate for a regulatory 
change. 
16. For recent explorations of the problem of path dependence and its relation to law 
and economics, see Roe 1998 and Milhaupt 1998. 
17. This section draws substantially from Fox and Heller 2000, discussing lessons 
for corporate governance theory from Russian enterprise fiascoes. 
18. As Blasi eta!. (1997) recount: 
The Russian general director is similar in authority to the chief executive officer 
(CEO) of a capitalist company .... In the past, a Soviet ministry could hire and fire 
him. Once Gorbachev removed cabinet supervision from the top managers of [the 
general director's] plant, the only formal authority over his enterprise was a distant 
state bureaucracy that was spinning out of control, and the now independent, author-
itarian [general director] could do what he pleased. [The general director] was prob-
ably tempted to treat the company as his personal property. This process has been 
called spontaneous privatization. (33) 
19. In 1988, medium (more than 200 employees) and large enterprises (more than 
1,000) accounted for about 95 percent of employees and production in Russia (Blasi et 
al. 1997, 25). In 1995 a few large, rich firms such as oil and gas companies were priva-
tized through a controversial "loan for shares" program that handed shares over to a 
number of financial-industrial groups controlled by new private tycoons. 
20. A third option attracted only 2 percent. This option allowed a management buy-
out on the promise of reaching particular restructuring targets (Blasi et a!. 1997, 41 ). 
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